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The U.S. Automakers' Reaction To The Japanese
by Paul A . Smith
America's love affair with the mechanical
''horseless carriage' !._the automobile-has
spanned decades, mobilized our society, and
changed our way of life. By 1980, nearly 84
percent of all U.S. households owned at least
one car, and 44 percent of those households
(37 percent of all households) owned two or
more automobiles (Orski 1980).
The U.S. auto manufacturers are primarily
located in one locale, Detroit, Michigan,
although each firm has assembly plants scattered across the country. For years, the products sold in the U.S. market were primarily
American built, but that is changing. Never
before has the future source of cars sold in
America been as uncertain as it is now. Imports are playing an important role in the
market, and the primary source of these cars
is Japan.
The U.S. auto industry is an oligopoly
whose primary players are "The Big Three' !._
General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor
Company and Chrysler Corporation. General
Motors markets its cars under the Cadillac,
Buick, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, and Chevrolet insignias. Ford markets its cars under the Lincoln, Mercury, and Ford brands and Chrysler
under the Chrysler, Plymouth, and Dodge
nameplates.
This paper will look at the success of the
Japanese automakers in the U.S. market and
explore how the U.S. automakers reacted to the
success of the Japanese.

A Brief History
Many think the automobile is a twentieth
century invention and frequently associate
Henry Ford with it. However, Ford never "invented" any part of the automobile; his
achievements were built upon the work of

others. Ford is responsible for the introduction of the moving assembly line in the auto
industry, but the honors for the first car are
shared by Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz of
Germany in late 1885 (Lacey 1986). DaimlerBenz is still in business today.
As late as 1960, car manufacturing was
centered primarily in Western Europe and the
United States, with each market relatively well
insulated from foreign competition. The U.S.
automobile-consuming market, which was
realizing rapid growth, accounted for a large
percentage of the world's automotive demand.
As Orski (1980) points out, the domestic auto
producing industry was the unchallenged giant
in the sixties, commanding a 48 percent share
of world output and facing international competition only in the luxury and subcompact
markets, for which it did not fight very hard.
Volkswagen was making inroads into the U.S.
market, but Japan had yet to produce a car
that could compete internationally.
During the 1970s, the Japanese automakers
came alive in the U.S. market. The mid-1970's
oil crisis made it clear that fuel-efficient small
cars were the answer to rising gasoline prices.
Japanese cars were small and fuel efficient,
and by the mid-seventies the production quality of their cars was superior to those being
built in Detroit. lacocca (1984) notes that
perhaps one of the greatest blunders on the
part of any U.S. manufacturer during this time
was Ford's scrapping of $2 billion worth of
future product development. Sensing that a
major depression was imminent in 1975,
Henry Ford II gave the order which caused the
number two automaker to lag further behind
GM. The decision eliminated many of the products that Ford needed to remain competitive,
including small cars and front-wheel-drive
technology, and shifted its customers to
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Japanese-produced small cars.
Prior to the oil crisis, there were a few
domestic attempts at producing small cars. In
1971, GM introduced the Vega under the
Chevrolet nameplate and Ford introduced the
Pinto. Both cars were aimed at the low-end of
the market, selling for an advertised $1,995.
However, both had quality problems that proved to be disastrous.
Also in 1971, Chrysler purchased 15 percent
of Mitsubishi Motor of Japan and arranged
to import some of Mitsubishi's small cars
under the Dodge and Chrysler nameplates
(lacocca 1984). Unfortunately, this joint venture took place at the same time the public
perceived Chrysler as being a producer of
poor-quality automobiles, so Chrysler was not
able to gain a significant advantage in the import market at that time.
Labor costs in the U.S. were also rising during this time period. By 1979, the Japanese
held a $2,000 cost advantage over the U.S.
manufacturers for each car they built. Recent
empirical work (Stafford 1981, p. 38) indicates
that wages grew more rapidly in the central
manufacturing and heavy industrial sectors
than in any other sector of the economy during the 1970s.
Once implying cheap products, "Made in
Japan" was by this time associated with highquality, affordable cars. Japanese automakers
such as Toyota, Datsun, Honda, and Mazda
increased their market shares during this time
period and built the foundation that caused
the problems that would plague Detroit for
years to come.
Duing the 1980s, U.S. automakers finally
reacted to the Japanese threat. According to
King (1986, pp. 6-7), overall, imports made up
almost 30 percent of total U.S. sales. Small car
imports from Korea, Yugoslavia, and even
Greece are expected to join Japan in capturing 45 percent of the 1986 low-end sales.
Chrysler and Ford stand to lose the most from
this shift since half or more of their cars compete in this segment. Even in the middle and
higher price ranges, the Germans and the

Japanese may take 15 percent of sales in 1986,
up three percentage points from 1985.
By 1980, with more than 120 million cars
on the road-one for every 1.2 licensed drivers
in the country-US. automobile demand was
close to saturation (Orski 1980). But market
saturation does not mean that sales will come
to an abrupt halt. Continued growth of
population and new households, plus growing
demand for second and even third cars, should
fuel continued market growth for the rest of
this century. With each passing year, a rising
proportion of the market will consist of
replacements, anticipated to be 90 percent by
1990 according to industry estimates reported
by Orski (1980). Because replacement decisions
can easily be postponed, a market that relies
heavily on replacements tends to be more sensitive to cyclical swings of the economy.

The Japanese Success Secret
Why have the Japanese been successful in the
U.S. market? First, because of rising gasoline
prices caused by OPEC oil embargoes, demand shifted to smaller, more fuel-efficient
cars. Prior to this shift in demand, Japan
could not carve a significant niche in the U.S.
market. Not until high levels of inflation,
coupled with a definite price advantage on the
part of the Japanese, could the imported cars
begin to develop their own markets.
Secondly, an abundant supply of cheap
labor, along with an abundance of cheap
parts, enabled Japan to hold on to its cost advantage. Detroit concedes it cannot afford to
produce small cars; it simply cannot make a
profit sufficient for staying in business. Rice
(1985, p. 31) reported that Honda could build
a fully-equipped Accord for about $8,000.
That was $1,000 to $1,500 less than it cost
General Motors to build a comparably equipped version of its Oldsmobile Calais or Buick
Somerset at its highly automated Lansing
plant. Ford, with a less modern plant in Kansas City, spent $1,500 to $2,000 more to build
a comparably-equipped Topaz or Tempo in the
same timeframe.
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For years companies like Chrysler produced
big cars and then spent money convincing the
American public that big cars were what it
wanted. Thus, U.S. firms were productionoriented in their product mix, whereas
Japanese firms were market-oriented. Any
time a firm is producing what buyers demand,
basic economics says that the firm will be able
to sell its product.
Finally, the Japanese products have evolved
to meet the tastes and demands of U.S. buyers.
More powerful, yet fuel-efficient engines, a
softer ride, more glass, and more interior room
have been added to recent imports to help
bolster sales.
One of the main reasons for Japan's industrial ascendancy was the manipulative
planning on the part of Japan's Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI).
MITl's job is to determine which industries
are critical to Japan's future and then to help
them in their research and development efforts. After World War II, MITI targeted the
auto industry, among others, as a critical industry. Thus, the economic destiny of the
Japanese automaker was not left up to the free
market totally but had the financial backing
of the Japanese government through MITI.
Production capacity, because of the influence
of MITI, has gone from 100,000 cars in the
1950s to over 11 million today (lacocca 1984).

The U.S. Lag
Why didn't the U.S. firms keep pace with
the market? It appears that the U.S. firms did
not fully comprehend the situation. The
automakers attempted to be like each other,
but they did not attempt to make cars that the
public wanted to buy. O'Donnell and Andresky (1982, p. 133) state that even at a time
when compacts and sub-compacts comprised
60 percent of the market, GM regarded the important small car market as "an unpleasant
aberration that would vanish, if there was
justice in heaven'.' They further write that GM
Chairman Roger Smith argued that, if a
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technological change suddenly made it possible to make gasoline out of seawater such that
the price of gasoline would drop a nickel,
Japanese penetration of the U.S. market would
cease to exist. This argument ignores the fact
that the Japanese penetration is based on more
than fuel economy and it is further proven
false by the recent decrease in retail gasoline
prices coupled with little change in sales
patterns.
Perhaps the biggest reason the U.S. firms
did not meet market demand and produce
small cars has to do with profitability. Analyst
Arvid Jouppi feels that in times of extraordinarily low demand, old notions about a proper return on equity are simply beside the
point and should not be applied. "Companies
that neglect market share because the return
on equity looks thin will pay dearly for it later
when demand strengthens:' he states (O'Donnell and Andresky 1982, p. 133).

U.S. Firms React
How did the U.S. firms react to the Japanese
success? At first glance, it might seem that the
U.S. firms simply started building better cars
that were more in line with demand and that
they did so to stay in business. Though partially true, this notion is far from totally
descriptive of what U.S. firms did.
One of the first changes involved jointventures with foreign firms, mostly Japanese.
Maralyn Enid writes in Business Week (1985)
that within a few years, U.S. companies will
be selling more than 750,000 units brought in
from the Far East while making an additional
600,000 Japanese-engineered cars in North
American factories. The cost will be about
250,000 lost jobs in the U.S., but the move
should allow U.S. companies to turn a profit
on what is now often a money-losing
operation.
Firms may undertake a joint-venture for
many reasons including avoiding competition
or sharing research and development results.
The problem with managing a joint-venture is
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that the parent company is, in effect, exercising control over a direct competitor. Even if
the joint company is confined to production
only, the parent firm still controls the supply
of the competitive product. However, no firm
will enter a joint-venture unless it is profitable
for it to do so.
Each of the Big Three has engaged in some
sort of joint-venture. General Motors joined
with Toyota and formed NUMMI (New
United Motor Manufacturing Inc.) to produce
the Chevrolet Nova. Modeled after the Corolla Sprinter sold in Japan, the Nova was
coveted by GM since it had nothing in its product line that was comparable. The advantages
for GM are utilizing an idle plant in Fremont,
California; being able to bring a car into production in substantially less time and at a
lower cost than it would do otherwise; and
observing firsthand the Japanese secrets for
building small cars at a profit, something GM
hasn't been able to do on its own. Toyota, on
the other hand, gets a firsthand look at U.S.
labor practices while simultaneously being
able to produce cars in the U.S., a valuable
condition should trade restrictions be
tightened.
Chrysler has also entered into a jointventure-with Mitsubishi of Japan. As Enid
reports (1985), the .two firms have agreed to
build up to 180,000 small cars at a still-to-beselected U.S. site. Each partner will sell half
the output through its own dealer network
beginning in 1988. Chrysler will also raise its
ownership of Mitsubishi to 24 percent. As a
result, roughly 42 percent of Chrysler's car
sales will come directly from Mitsubishi (in the
form of imports) or the joint-venture. Mitsubishi already supplies subcompact Colts and
Ram 50 mini-pickups to Chrysler along with
many of the engines used throughout the
Chrysler line. Enid points out that since the
joint-venture company will have no pension
liability or health care costs for retired
workers, labor costs will be lowered. Labor
costs should also be lower because the company anticipates reduced wages and flexible
work rules in exchange for recognizing the

United Auto Workers as the bargaining agent
for its blue collar employees. This will give
Chrysler an avenue to observe and learn
Japanese management techniques. Mitsubishi,
the distant number three automaker in Japan,
will benefit by obtaining a plant in the U.S.
that it could not otherwise afford. Enid contends that its new plant will be closer to its own
dealer network and give it access to the U. S.
market in the event new trade restrictions are
imposed.
Like the other members of the Big Three,
Ford also has negotiated a joint-venture. But,
unlike the others, Ford's joint-venture is with
Italy's Fiat. Ford and Fiat rank No. I and No.
2, respectively, in the European market, accounting for 26 percent of unit sales in that
market (Taggiasco, et al 1985). Ford views the
merger as a combination that will result in
small-car know-how that will challenge even
the Japanese. Although most of the output
· will be aimed at the European market, shipping small cars to the U.S. based upon demand
is a possibility (Tagiasco, et al 1985). The main
advantage to Ford in the venture is the joining with one of only a few European
automakers that demonstrates profitability.
Fiat's advantage from entering the venture is
increased market power in its home market.
The automakers have also introduced new
product lines of their own design to compete
with the Japanese-and with each other for
that matter. For General Motors it is the introduction of Saturn Corporation, and for
Chrysler it is the innovative mini-van.
Saturn was originally designed to be a
computer-designed car stressing high quality
and utilizing both manufacturing techniques
and construction materials totally new to the
industry. It was to be a paperless company
with little or no inventory at the dealer level.
A paperless company is one where all ordering is done directly to the factory via a computer terminal rather than by using paper
order forms. Customers would determine how
they wanted their car built and then take
delivery of it in two to three weeks. Saturn
would accomplish the fast delivery time with

Paul A. Smith
the use of computer technology and innovative
inventory and assembly practices. However,
GM has recently started cutting fu nding fo r
the Saturn project. Whether the firm can produce a car by the targeted 1990 date (if at all)
is still to be seen. Perhaps the greatest risk is
that if Saturn fails, it may mean the end to
American superiority in introducing new product lines (Buss, et al 1986). On the other
hand, if it succeeds, GM will most likely use
the technological advances it gains from the
less-profitable small cars and apply them to
its higher-profit big cars.
Much of Chrysler's strength can be seen in
its mini-van, the front-wheel drive hybrid of
a car and a van. Chrysler sold 148,000 minivans during the introductory model year of
1984 with no television and little print advertising (Flax 1985). While Chrysler was doubling its production, it took GM and Ford two
years to introduce competing models and only Toyota competes among the imports.
Ironically, the mini-van was developed at
Ford in the early 1970s by Harold Sperlich
(now president of Chrysler) and others but was
shelved by Henry Ford II after market research
indicated annual sales of less than 600,000
units (Flax, 1985). Lee lacocca (former President of Ford, now Chairman of Chrysler) and
Sperlich bet $700 million on the product and
put it into production. Many of the needed
parts were already being made by Chrysler including engines, transaxles, and some steering
parts used in the production of K-cars (Flax
1985). As a result, the average profit per minivan runs somewhere between $2,000 and
$4,000 per unit, and it has carved out a new
market niche for itself that has been left
almost completely unchallenged by the
Japanese (Flax 1985).
New plants designed to cut costs and improve product quality have been opened
recently, most notably the Chrysler Sterling
Heights and GM Buick City plants. This is
another method U.S. automakers used to
become more competitive.
For Buick, the goal was to build a worldclass quality car that was cost-effective and
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that utilized new and innovative manufacturing techniques. The Buick City concept is based on eleven elements designed to eliminate
waste. These include synchronized production;
plus or minus zero performance to schedule;
planned maintenance; problem visibility and
resolution; small, specialized work units;
reduced set-up times for retooling; process improvements; employee involvement; just-intime inventory; changes in span of control;
and efficient use of facilities.
The primary purpose of implementing the
Buick City concept was to make GM more
competitive with the Japanese automakers.
Since the American public considered U.S.
products to be different from the imports with
reference to quality, quality needed to be
stressed in order to maintain, or even regain,
market shares.
According to Stone and Guith (1985), with
this concept, parts are made for specific cars
and at a specific rate and this production rate
is geared to a predetermined production
number each shift. Also, quality of supplier
parts is required with the goal of suppliers providing 100 percent reliable parts 100 percent
of the time. A sense of teamwork is fostered
such that the next operator is treated as if he
is the ultimate consumer, and workers only
pass perfect products to that customer. There
is a guarantee that if a person's job is
eliminated because of technology or productivity improvements, the employee will be
retrained. Buick City also pays closer attention to ergonomics-the relationship between
the person and the job. The plant further
utilizes just-in-time inventory which means
reduced handling and warehouse costs.
Almost half the size of a normal U.S. assembly
plant, this facility closely resembles a Japanese
plant.
The concept does present some problems
for GM. Despite a substantial investment in
the highly roboticized plant, it is less efficient
than the labor-intensive joint-venture plant in
Fremont, California. GM has learned that
simply organizing work more efficiently and
giving workers more say can produce more
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impressive results than millions of dollars
worth of robots (Hampton, et al 1987). In
essence, Japanese-style management is proving to be more effective than a highly capitalized, fully automated manufacturing plant.
Sterling Heights is Chrysler's answer to improved quality and a more efficient operation.
As Dauch (1 985, p. 48) explains, the plant incorporates computer-integrated manufacturing, just-in-time inventory practices,
technologically advanced assembly operations,
added emphasis on system and component
reliability testing, and employee involvement
in environmental concerns. According to
Dauch, this process, called ''in-line sequencing'' by the company, allows Chrysler to accomplish its goal of building a world-class
automobile.
The automakers have also reacted by cutting their overall fixed costs, trimming their
operations in an attempt to lessen the per unit
cost advantage of the Japanese. They have cut
their costs over the past few years by massive
layoffs (both of union and non-union company employees); closing many of the older,
less productive and more costly, plants; and
making many of the changes mentioned
earlier that are incorporated in the new plants.
Chrysler has cut its costs on items that
directly affect the "America" program-a
restyled Omni/Horizon with a base sticker
price of slightly less than $6,000 (Sease 1986).
Previously, the car had many options and
packages available which made possible some
eight million permutations of the car. Under
the America program, Chrysler made many
items standard so that the possible permutations have dropped to 42 and exterior color options have dropped to six from 13. Two-tone
paint options have also been banned saving a
second trip of the car through the paint shop,
plus the hand-masking of it by workers making over $13 per hour (Hyatt 1986).
An overabundance of production accounts
for one of the major sources of financial losses
in the auto industry, especially when a price
war in the form of cut-throat financing ensues.
Such was the case in late summer and early

fall of 1986 as GM dropped its financing rate
on new car sales to 2.9 percent. That move was
followed by Ford's drop to 2.9 percent,
Chrysler's drop to 2.4 percent and American
Motors' drop to zero percent.
Diversification and integration are other
ways the U.S. automakers are trying to stay
competitive and profitable. Because of
stringent requirements made by the automakers, they are finding it easier t0 take over
suppliers than to purchase parts from outsiders. The carmakers have determined that
diversification is the smart way to go; the profitable future is not necessarily parked in the
garage. By the year 2000, GM wants non-auto
sales to be 20 percent of its business compared
with 4 percent in 1984 (Hyatt 1986). Ford and
Chrysler also have pla ns for heavy
diversification.
These auto makers are buying firms
· involved in financial services, farm equipment, and aerospace, all areas in which there
is little foreign competition. GM's acquisitions
of Electronic Data Systems and Hughes Aircraft should help to improve the profit stability of the automaker for years to come.

Conclusions
U.S. automakers' reactions to the success
of the Japanese have been to lessen the cost
difference between Japanese and U.S. cars
and to shift market shares from the Japanese
back to the U.S. companies. The moves have
been designed to improve profitability and
restore confidence in the eyes of the American
buyer regarding product quality.
Perceptions of product quality were at an
all-time low in the early 1980s. "And for good
reason," stated Iacocca (1984, p. 270). " We
shipped a lot of crap out of Detroit in our
day." That perception has changed and the
U.S. auto industry is, at least temporarily,
surviving, in part because of improved quality, decreased costs, new technologies, jointventures, diversification, and integration.
It appears there no longer exists a "U.S."
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auto market; such a phenomenon is antiquated. Any company wishing to compete in
the automobile industry in the future must
move its sights from a domestic to a global
operation. The automobile market is now
world-wide with all firms entering all markets.
The key to survival for any producer is to actively pursue these international markets.
Should the U.S. producers have ever fallen
as far behind as they did? Probably not, but
they were not prepared for change. Perhaps
the leaders of the auto industry fo rgot the
words of the late Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., Chairman of GM from 1937 to 1956, who said:

There have been and always will be many opportunities to fail in the automobile industry.
The circumstances of the ever-changing
market and ever-changing product are capable
of breaking that business organization if that
organization is unprepared for changeindeed, in my opinion, if it has not provided
procedures for anticipating change. (O'Donnell, et al 1982, p. 131)
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